

**From:** Andrew Janca <andrew.janca.2@outlook.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 2, 2022 00:45  
**To:** -----@motherjones.com; -----@motherjones.com;  
-----@motherjones.com; -----@motherjones.com  
**Cc:** scoop@motherjones.com; Janca, Andrew  
**Subject:** 1/2 – Documentation. Pandemics, pp. 173-86. Hurricanes, 187-96. Power loss deaths, 197-98. Fire, 231-36, 563-80. Tornadoes, 217-30. Border surge, 543-62. Terror & political violence (domestic, foreign, left, right), 307-78. Climate change, 472-88.  
**Attachments:** Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) 2015 - Consolidated unclassified documentation.pdf; Full unclassified documentation (original pdfs).zip; Attachment list 20220901.pdf

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Please select the Phish Alert Report button on the top right of your screen to report this email if it is unsolicited or suspicious in nature.

This was supposed to go out to every state, tribal, territorial, Federal, and community emergency manager in the Nation in 2015. It got buried instead. That was mostly my fault, but I haven't been able to undo it since (*How this happened*, p. 2

[https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5\\_U.S.C.\\_2302\\_justification/SNRA\\_FAQ\\_20190319.pdf#page=2](https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5_U.S.C._2302_justification/SNRA_FAQ_20190319.pdf#page=2)).

The first attached is a one-volume consolidated version/binder of the unclassified documentation of record. The latter (the original May/June 2015 pdfs with the draft labels still on them) is in the zipfile. Page numbers below refer to the first attached.

**Everything is 100% unclassified.**

Some relevant parts (note that not everything below is bad):

- **Pandemics.** Relative risk, p. 27 (figure 2a). Detail, pp. 173-186, 593-596.
- **Electric grid** related risks. The SNRA's power loss mortality model ([https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5\\_U.S.C.\\_2302\\_justification/Sent\\_in\\_July/Sent\\_July\\_4/SNRA\\_follow-up\\_letter\\_20201016.pdf](https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5_U.S.C._2302_justification/Sent_in_July/Sent_July_4/SNRA_follow-up_letter_20201016.pdf) pp. 1-2) is primarily documented in the space weather chapter, pp. 197-198, 201, 204-205. The low estimate (which the SNRA uses for its own numbers) is 1.8 deaths/million people-days. The high estimate which accurately predicted Maria's deaths is 11.25 deaths/million people-days.
  - **Space weather**, pp. 27 (figure 2b), 197-215.
  - **Physical attack on the electric grid**, pp. 365-377.
  - **Electric grid failure (natural/accidental)**, pp. 503-508.
  - **Cyber-attacks** on the electric grid, pp. 642-645.
- **Climate change**, pp. F-21 - F-23 [front insert], 472-488, 559-560.
  - The final (2016) versions of the maps on pp. 485-488 are in [www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1400/RR1453/RAND\\_RR1453.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1453/RAND_RR1453.pdf).
- **Drought**, pp. 147-154.
- **Heat waves**, pp. 509-514.
  - The missing low/best/high frequencies in the data table on page 514 are 0.14 / 0.29 / 3 events/year respectively [1]. For annualized risk comparisons, the average (1,500 deaths / year) of the 1,000-2,000 deaths/year range on page 511 is a suitable best estimate. [2]
- **Hurricanes**, pp. 27 (figure 2b), 187-196.
- **Tornadoes**, pp. 217-230.
- **Wildfires**, pp. 231-236 and 537-538.
  - **Fires and explosions** of generally unintentional origin, pp. 269-278, 527-542, 563-569.
- **Winter storms**, pp. 237-246.
- **Migrant surges / mass migration**, pp. 543-562.

- DHS defines risk as the potential for an *unwanted* outcome (SNRA terms of reference page 1/1a footnote 4, [https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5\\_U.S.C.\\_2302\\_justification/What's\\_missing.pdf](https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5_U.S.C._2302_justification/What's_missing.pdf)), not a bad outcome. Border surges are unwanted events, but the people in them are good.
- **Energy, food, water, and supply chain** risks to society, pp. 465-468, 479-480, 638-641.
- **Unclassified** conventional and 2015 cyber-terrorism analyses, pp. 58-60, 307-378, 501-649.
  - Details that the SNRA omits in its own tables are in their cited sources (most are in pp. 57-66 of [https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-terrorism-2002-2005-terror02\\_05.pdf](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-terrorism-2002-2005-terror02_05.pdf)).
- **Unclassified** portions of CBRN and 2011 cyber-terrorism analyses, pp. 61-66, 379-408.

[1] Low frequency:  $0.14 = 1/7$  years, the longest gap between events in table 7 (p. 513). Best estimate frequency = 0.29/year, 6 events in 21 years (p. 512). High frequency = 3 / year (max # of events in one year [1999]). I made the decision (I was the technical lead for FEMA's 2015 update) to leave the data table on page 514 incomplete in 2015 because I mistakenly believed that the small number of data points indicated an incomplete record, when in fact they accurately reflected the dispersal in time that characterize great heat wave events in this country. So they are the best numbers to use.

[2] Since most fatality risk comes from heat events outside the 100+ fatality threshold for this SNRA hazard, the 1,000 – 2,000 deaths / year number referenced on page 511 is more appropriate for annualized risk comparisons than the 73 deaths / year average of the threshold set (258 average deaths / event times 0.29 events / year). The best-estimate average of that range (1,500/year) matches AP's current estimate, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/americans-threatened-extreme-heat-record-temperatures> (2022/06/21).

I am not speaking for my Department or Component, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present colleagues. I will forward these letters to my chain of command, DHS, and DHS/FEMA next: I'll let you know when that's done, probably some time tonight or tomorrow.

Everything is unclassified, and non-security sensitive.

The unredacted information that these letters, attachments, and links communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca  
[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com) (this address)

---

**From:** Andrew Janca  
**Sent:** September 2, 2022 12:40 AM  
**To:** -----@motherjones.com; -----@motherjones.com; -----@motherjones.com; -----@motherjones.com  
**Cc:** scoop@motherjones.com; andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov; andrew.janca.2@outlook.com  
**Subject:** FW: 0/2 - RE: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.  
**Attachments:** Attachment list 20220901.pdf

Hello -- The documentation and context follow. The attachments dated June 27 are still current: nothing has changed since, I'm just a [very] slow writer. I'm sending the attachment list by itself first, so you'll know if something didn't come through.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca  
[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com) (this address)

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**From:** Andrew Janca  
**Sent:** Monday, June 27, 2022 7:58 AM  
**To:** -----@eenews.net <-----@eenews.net>; [investigations@npr.org](mailto:investigations@npr.org) <[investigations@npr.org](mailto:investigations@npr.org)>; [editors@sciam.com](mailto:editors@sciam.com) <[editors@sciam.com](mailto:editors@sciam.com)>; [tips@rollingstone.com](mailto:tips@rollingstone.com) <[tips@rollingstone.com](mailto:tips@rollingstone.com)>;

[tips@nationalreview.com](mailto:tips@nationalreview.com) <[tips@nationalreview.com](mailto:tips@nationalreview.com)>; [wsjcontact@wsj.com](mailto:wsjcontact@wsj.com) <[wsjcontact@wsj.com](mailto:wsjcontact@wsj.com)>;  
[tips@latimes.com](mailto:tips@latimes.com) <[tips@latimes.com](mailto:tips@latimes.com)>; [covidtips@kff.org](mailto:covidtips@kff.org) <[covidtips@kff.org](mailto:covidtips@kff.org)>; [historiasph@gfrmedia.com](mailto:historiasph@gfrmedia.com)  
<[historiasph@gfrmedia.com](mailto:historiasph@gfrmedia.com)>; [redaccion@elvocero.com](mailto:redaccion@elvocero.com) <[redaccion@elvocero.com](mailto:redaccion@elvocero.com)>  
**Cc:** [andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov) <[andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov)>; [lockbox@washpost.com](mailto:lockbox@washpost.com)  
<[lockbox@washpost.com](mailto:lockbox@washpost.com)>; [national@washpost.com](mailto:national@washpost.com) <[national@washpost.com](mailto:national@washpost.com)>; [news@unionleader.com](mailto:news@unionleader.com)  
<[news@unionleader.com](mailto:news@unionleader.com)>; [tips@nytimes.com](mailto:tips@nytimes.com) <[tips@nytimes.com](mailto:tips@nytimes.com)>; [tips@reason.com](mailto:tips@reason.com) <[tips@reason.com](mailto:tips@reason.com)>;  
[info@thebulwark.com](mailto:info@thebulwark.com) <[info@thebulwark.com](mailto:info@thebulwark.com)>; -----@amgreatness.com <-----@amgreatness.com>;  
[scoop@motherjones.com](mailto:scoop@motherjones.com) <[scoop@motherjones.com](mailto:scoop@motherjones.com)>; [contactus@foxnews.com](mailto:contactus@foxnews.com) <[contactus@foxnews.com](mailto:contactus@foxnews.com)>;  
[coverage-desk@voanews.com](mailto:coverage-desk@voanews.com) <[coverage-desk@voanews.com](mailto:coverage-desk@voanews.com)>; [info@truthout.org](mailto:info@truthout.org) <[info@truthout.org](mailto:info@truthout.org)>;  
-----@protonmail.com < @protonmail.com>; [editorial@newsmax.com](mailto:editorial@newsmax.com) <[editorial@newsmax.com](mailto:editorial@newsmax.com)>;  
[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com) <[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com)>

**Subject:** 0/2 - RE: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.

**Attachments:** Attachment list 20220627.pdf

Hello – I'm sending the follow-up next. I'm sending the attachment list by itself first, so you'll know if something didn't come through. It may be slow.

I'm writing some of you for the first time. Everything I've sent before is at  
[https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5\\_U.S.C.\\_2302\\_justification/Sent\\_in\\_July/index.html](https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5_U.S.C._2302_justification/Sent_in_July/index.html).

Truthout covered the SNRA in 2018, <https://truthout.org/articles/key-assessment-of-climate-threats-cyberwar-and-terrorism-goes-missing-under-my-former-boss/>.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca  
[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com) (this address)

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**From:** Andrew Janca

**Sent:** Tuesday, July 20, 2021 10:53 PM

**To:**----- @eenews.net; [investigations@npr.org](mailto:investigations@npr.org); [editors@sciam.com](mailto:editors@sciam.com); [tips@rollingstone.com](mailto:tips@rollingstone.com);  
[tips@nationalreview.com](mailto:tips@nationalreview.com); [wsjcontact@wsj.com](mailto:wsjcontact@wsj.com); [tips@latimes.com](mailto:tips@latimes.com); [covidtips@kff.org](mailto:covidtips@kff.org)

**Cc:** [mediainquiry@hq.dhs.gov](mailto:mediainquiry@hq.dhs.gov); [FEMA-News-Desk@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:FEMA-News-Desk@fema.dhs.gov); [andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov);  
[lockbox@washpost.com](mailto:lockbox@washpost.com); [national@washpost.com](mailto:national@washpost.com); [news@unionleader.com](mailto:news@unionleader.com); [tips@nytimes.com](mailto:tips@nytimes.com);  
[tips@reason.com](mailto:tips@reason.com); [info@thebulwark.com](mailto:info@thebulwark.com);-----@amgreatness.com; [scoop@motherjones.com](mailto:scoop@motherjones.com);  
[contactus@foxnews.com](mailto:contactus@foxnews.com); [coverage-desk@voanews.com](mailto:coverage-desk@voanews.com); [andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com)

**Subject:** Corrected version - RE: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.

**Attachments:** Substantiation of assertions in email text - 5 USC 2302 20210704 (corrected).pdf; Corrections indicated 20210720.pdf

Hello – I'm correcting a small error in figure 1. I also removed some parts that don't make sense, so it's shorter. The corrections are indicated in the second attached. I'll write again next week.

I'm cc-ing my organizations' public affairs not to suggest I'm speaking for them – I'm not, of course (I'm assuming it's obvious) – but so you'll know that you don't need to worry about keeping me anonymous from DHS or FEMA. I've been open with my management about my whistleblowing since 2013. These issues as they manifest internally are strongly normative, and norms are established or re-established in the open.

DHS, FEMA – I usually find a way to funnel whatever whistleblowing I do into a communication to committee staff so I can use FEMA's Report of Congressional Contact process to notify everyone who needs to know internally. I don't see a way to do that now that wouldn't seem contrived, because I'm not adding anything to what they already saw two weeks ago. I'll still forward this to my management and office lawyer, but please feel free to notify whoever else you think is appropriate.

I am not speaking for my Department or agency, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present colleagues.

The unredacted information that these letters, attachments, and links communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca  
[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com) (this address)

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**From:** [andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com)

**Sent:** Sunday, July 4, 2021 11:56 PM

**To:** -----@eenews.net <-----@eenews.net>; [investigations@npr.org](mailto:investigations@npr.org) <[investigations@npr.org](mailto:investigations@npr.org)>; [editors@sciam.com](mailto:editors@sciam.com) <[editors@sciam.com](mailto:editors@sciam.com)>; [tips@rollingstone.com](mailto:tips@rollingstone.com) <[tips@rollingstone.com](mailto:tips@rollingstone.com)>; [tips@nationalreview.com](mailto:tips@nationalreview.com) <[tips@nationalreview.com](mailto:tips@nationalreview.com)>; [wsjcontact@wsj.com](mailto:wsjcontact@wsj.com) <[wsjcontact@wsj.com](mailto:wsjcontact@wsj.com)>; [tips@latimes.com](mailto:tips@latimes.com) <[tips@latimes.com](mailto:tips@latimes.com)>; [covidtips@kff.org](mailto:covidtips@kff.org) <[covidtips@kff.org](mailto:covidtips@kff.org)>

**Cc:** [andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov) <[andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov)>; [lockbox@washpost.com](mailto:lockbox@washpost.com) <[lockbox@washpost.com](mailto:lockbox@washpost.com)>; [national@washpost.com](mailto:national@washpost.com) <[national@washpost.com](mailto:national@washpost.com)>; [news@unionleader.com](mailto:news@unionleader.com) <[news@unionleader.com](mailto:news@unionleader.com)>; [tips@nytimes.com](mailto:tips@nytimes.com) <[tips@nytimes.com](mailto:tips@nytimes.com)>; [tips@reason.com](mailto:tips@reason.com) <[tips@reason.com](mailto:tips@reason.com)>; [info@thebulwark.com](mailto:info@thebulwark.com) <[info@thebulwark.com](mailto:info@thebulwark.com)>; -----@amgreatness.com <-----@amgreatness.com>; [scoop@motherjones.com](mailto:scoop@motherjones.com) <[scoop@motherjones.com](mailto:scoop@motherjones.com)>; [contactus@foxnews.com](mailto:contactus@foxnews.com) <[contactus@foxnews.com](mailto:contactus@foxnews.com)>; [coverage-desk@voanews.com](mailto:coverage-desk@voanews.com) <[coverage-desk@voanews.com](mailto:coverage-desk@voanews.com)>; [andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com)

**Subject:** (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.

**Attachments:** What's missing.pdf; SNRA letter to committee staff March 2019.pdf; SNRA FAQ 20190319 redacted.pdf; SNRA follow-up letter 20201016.pdf; Substantiation and context.zip; Attachment list 20210704.docx

Summary: The DHS/FEMA Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) is the science-based comparative national risk assessment of natural, accidental, and adversarial hazards that FEMA's National Preparedness System is based on. It has been locked up since 2011. (The SNRA's climate change analysis is the only Government climate study that I know of that has been suppressed by both parties.) While classification and disagreements with DHS HQ had much to do with that before 2015, neither has been an obstacle since. As far as I know, the decisions to suppress the science that FEMA's plans, requirements, and doctrine are based on have been made by DHS/FEMA itself since 2015.

I don't have the moral credibility or communication skills to solve this problem inside the Government. Everything I've tried has failed. That is why I'm writing you now.

The context and documentation for the statements above is attached. Larger files (all of which are already public information) are in <https://bd02.github.io/external>. I will forward this to the committee staff I wrote to before, to my Department and agency, and to the addressees and cc-ed on the forwarded email below tomorrow.

I am not speaking for my Department or agency, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present colleagues.

The unredacted information that these letters, attachments, and links communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca  
[andrew.janca.2@outlook.com](mailto:andrew.janca.2@outlook.com)

---

**From:** Janca, Andrew <[andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 27, 2020 07:21

**To:** --- AUSA ---@usdoj.gov; --- POC GAO-20-297 ---@gao.gov

**Cc:** OGC <[ogc@HQ.DHS.GOV](mailto:ogc@HQ.DHS.GOV)>; FEMA-OCC <[FEMA-OCC@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:FEMA-OCC@fema.dhs.gov)>; GAO-OIG Liaison <[GAO-OIG.Liaison@HQ.DHS.GOV](mailto:GAO-OIG.Liaison@HQ.DHS.GOV)>; FEMA-GAO-OIG-LIAISON <[FEMA-GAO-OIG-LIAISON@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:FEMA-GAO-OIG-LIAISON@fema.dhs.gov)>; Media Inquiry <[MediaInquiry@HQ.DHS.GOV](mailto:MediaInquiry@HQ.DHS.GOV)>; FEMA-News-Desk <[FEMA-News-Desk@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:FEMA-News-Desk@fema.dhs.gov)>; Janca, Andrew <[andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov)>

**Subject:** 1/3 - What my agency (DHS/FEMA) is telling each of you is factually inconsistent with what we're telling the other

Hello – Recent statements that my agency has given GAO and the press factually conflict with sworn declarations that my agency has given in court.

I drew my agency's attention to the inconsistencies between the latter, and the information which my agency later communicated to GAO and the press, in February. My agency has not corrected them.

(I'm talking around the subject to some extent because the non-disclosure agreements that that unsuccessful correction attempt left me with limit what I can put in a cover letter with multiple recipients on my end. So I'm trying to say as much as I can without going into the protected content.)

These inconsistencies are public, but currently below the threshold of public awareness. Since I have pointed them out to others outside the Executive Branch (footnotes 10-12, SNRA follow-up letter 20201016.pdf inside the second attachment), I'm obligated to tell you too. I haven't contacted the journalist yet, but I'll work on that next.

The three public inconsistencies that are the easiest to start with are

- <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/28/1/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/> paragraph 8;
- <https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/706612.pdf> pp. 11-12, 28; and
- <https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1062857757> (if the link doesn't work there's a pdf copy in the second attached).

The connecting context is the DHS/FEMA Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA), the "risk basis" of the National Preparedness System and the subject of a briefed-but-pending FOIA litigation (1:18-cv-00158-CKK) that ---AUSA--- inherited in May. I helped FEMA update this risk assessment in 2015, and I signed off on the language that FEMA used to tell the public what it said. The FOIA case duplicates a FOIA request that I made in October 2016.

I have also worked on the National THIRA that is referenced in these parts. It is a very different kind of thing than the SNRA: neither product is capable of filling the role of the other. My agency's use of it to bury something else should not be allowed to discredit the honest work that my colleagues have done on it.

This email is 1 of 3. Attached to this and the next two emails are what I sent committee staff Friday before last (October 16), July 2020, and March 2019, including the unclassified SNRA itself. The last attachment to this email is the one piece from my February correction attempt (a FOIA for what FEMA later told GAO and the journalist) that I can share without restriction. I've redacted the protected content, but the rest will still be helpful for context. Additional context:

- GAO: Relevant context is GAO-11-873 and 16-371 (DHS context), 16-243 (risk comparisons), and prior reports referenced in GAO-20-297. The 'missing' methodology report I mentioned in the SNRA FAQ p. 6 (How does the SNRA relate to DHS' HSNRC?) is the missing documentation discussed in GAO-16-371. Declaration 28-1 in ---AUSA---'s case discusses another GAO document in paragraph 10.
- DHS/FEMA public affairs [cc-ed]: Relevant context is <https://www.eenews.net/stories/1062824495>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20140502084541/https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/NPS-LLIS.pdf> 3-6, 3-7, 3-12, 3-16, <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf> 460-463, SNRA 2011/15 and HSNRC 2013/17 pandemic and comparative analyses, QHSR 2014 Bio Study, and the QHSR 2014 homeland

biosecurity national capability targets. The targets were classified in their final version: I believe this is why they disappeared, but I don't actually know.

- USAO: I will forward you the full February 18, 2020 packet (including the unredacted version of the last attachment) separately. The main differences with the Trusted Traveler case (<https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16824447/113/state-of-new-york-v-wolf/> pp. 16-17, <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16824447/124/state-of-new-york-v-wolf/> p. 9) are 1) my agency did not correct the problematic filing when I pointed out its inconsistencies with other information; 2) my agency subsequently made those inconsistencies public (above); and 3) the real-world consequences of my agency's choices in your case.

The information these letters and attachments communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

I apologize for the awkwardness of this letter.

**Andrew Janca, PhD**

National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Phone: (202) 786-0937

[andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov](mailto:andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov)

*Warning: This communication, along with any attachments, is covered by federal and state law governing electronic communications and may contain confidential and legally privileged information such as found under 49 CFR 1520 or the Privacy Act of 1974. It should not be communicated to any person, or agency, unless disclosure is in performance of official DHS duties and there exists a valid need to know. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, use or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this in error, please reply immediately to the sender and delete this message. Thank you.*