andrew.janca@outlook.com

From: Andrew Janca Sent: Monday, July 27, 2020 7:18 AM ----- PII -----@energy.senate.gov; ----- PII -----@energy.senate.gov To: Cc: ----- PII -----@mail.house.gov; ----- PII -----@mail.house.gov; ----- PII -----@mail.house.gov; energy.commerce@mail.house.gov; ----- PII -----@mail.house.gov; ----- PII ----whistleblower@ronjohnson.senate.gov; peters_whistleblower@hsgac.senate.gov; ----- PII -----@commerce.senate.gov; --- PII -----@commerce.senate.gov; andrew.janca@outlook.com; andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov Subject: Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) - 1/3 - Start here: Explanations - (personal-account email 1/3) Attachments: Cover letter (March 2019).docx; SNRA FOIA appeal (2018).pdf; SNRA FOIA correspondence 2016-18.zip; SNRA FOIA letter, appeal refs.zip; (Updated July 2020) PEER SNRA FOIA case to 20200528.zip; SNRA FAQ 20190319.docx; (Added July 2020) Maria charts from SNRA PR data FOIA 20200218.pdf

Ms. --, Mr. -- [majority and minority staff POCs, Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee]

I'm writing about a DHS/FEMA risk assessment called the Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA). I was the technical lead for FEMA's 2015 update. Most of it has been locked up since then. FEMA claimed my team's work as the risk basis of its updated plans and doctrine (https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/25959 main link pp. 4-5), but buried the documentation which describes what the national risk picture that FEMA says they're based on actually is. It is still buried today.

The SNRA is a national risk assessment. It was designed to help decision-makers at all levels plan for and prioritize the greatest risks to the Nation, and to their own communities, in an objective, coherent, and accountable way. The consequences of FEMA's burial of it to shield its own planning assumptions from critical scrutiny extend well beyond the agency's own work.

I wrote the cc-ed committees about this problem (see email below the break) in March 2019. I'm including your committee when I follow up with them because of #1 below, so I'm forwarding you what I sent them last year. I've sent you the unclassified SNRA documentation from my work account (andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov); the FOIA-redacted versions in the next two emails from this account; and context and explanations in this email. I will phone you later this week.

Of the information that I sent last year, the parts that will probably be of most interest are in the section "Is there anything else in particular in the SNRA that we might be interested in?", March 2019 FAQ page 7 (SNRA FAQ 20190319.docx, sixth attached).

- 1) The SNRA's power loss mortality model appears to have accurately projected the deaths from Maria (last attached). I didn't emphasize this in my March 2019 letter because at the time I believed the converse was true. As far as I know, this didn't influence FEMA's decisions about the SNRA in any way: I didn't realize it myself until after I wrote the cc-ed last year. This information may be relevant for state and local response decisions this year.
- 2) For pandemic risk, the comparison with other hazards in the unclassified SNRA (SNRA Resource for Planners figure 3 page 27 [pdf p. 65], email 1/3 [subject line "SNRA unclassified documentation 1/3"] from my work account andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov) may be more relevant than the bioterrorism one I mentioned in the FAQ.

I was hoping that my agency would have resolved its issues with the SNRA before this disaster season started, but it hasn't. I have exhausted the corrective routes that are available to me inside the Government, including the ones that the cc-ed pointed me to last year.

All information is unclassified. Some filesizes differ from what I sent last year because of filesize optimizations to fit them into fewer emails. As I did last year, I'm forwarding what I am sending you to FEMA and DHS legislative affairs and my chain of command for their visibility.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca <u>andrew.janca@outlook.com</u> (202) 375-0023 (personal)