Armed Assault

A hostile, non-state actor(s) uses assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) within the U.S., resulting in at least one fatality or injury.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0	2[1]	334
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	0	6	810
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	$61,000	$510,000	$78 million
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home ≥ 2 Days	0	0	0
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact[2]	Qualitative Bins	*De minimus*[3]		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events[4]	Number of Events per Year	0.11	0.48	3

Overview

Frequency, fatality, and injury estimates for the 2015 SNRA Armed Assault event were derived from unclassified statistical and historical data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).[5] These primary FBI sources were supplemented with data and research from multiple secondary public sources, in particular the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD)[6] (the primary source for impact data for the 2011 SNRA event), peer-reviewed literature, and U.S. and foreign press sources.

[1] Best estimate fatalities, 1.94 (weighted average fatalities given attack).

[2] In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimus (none) categories.

[3] Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

[4] Low estimate, inverse of maximum inter-arrival time between U.S. historical incidents, Tab le 1 (9 years, 1985 to 1994); best estimate, average frequency 1980–2012, Table 1; high estimate, most incidents in one year (3 in 2009), Table 1.

[5] FBI (1982), FBI (1983), FBI (1984), FBI (1986), FBI (2000), FBI (2006), FBI (2011); additional FBI sources as cited.

[6] The GTD is an open-source database including information on terrorism events around the world (including domestic, transnational, and international incidents) from 1970 to 2010. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the group or individual responsible.
START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is a DHS Center of Excellence and network of scholars coordinated from the University of Maryland. Since 2011 when the first SNRA was executed the START GTD has become the most commonly cited source for global terrorism statistical data, and is now used as the primary data source (with similar parameters as the 2011 SNRA) for the U.S. Government's annual Statistical Annex on Terrorism published for the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism. START GTD (2013).

Assumptions

Historical incident statistics published by the FBI were used as the primary data source for this event. These were supplemented with additional data from the START Global Terrorism Database,[7] scholarly reviews, and press sources as needed.

Historical incidents of indiscriminate violence resulting in one or more fatality or injury other than the attacker(s), identified as acts of terrorism by U.S. Government sources, occurring in the U.S. homeland between 1980 and 2012 were included (Table 1). All of the following criteria were required to be met:

- U.S. Government (FBI) characterization of the incident as a terrorist attack;
- Occurring within the U.S. homeland;[8]
- Resulting in at least one fatality or injury, other than the attacker(s);
- Indiscriminate (assassinations are excluded from scope); and
- Meeting the definition of the Armed Assault event given above.

Targeted attacks where the victim was known and selected by the attacker were considered assassinations, as opposed to armed assault/active shooter incidents (regardless of whether they met other criteria for terrorism). However, attacks targeting particular people that resulted in harm to others were included in the scope of this event.

The beginning observation period date of 1/1/1980 was determined by the primary FBI source data set which included U.S. incidents from 1980 to 2005.[9] The end observation date of 12/31/2012 was selected, because in many cases a definite determination by the U.S. Government that an act is terrorist in nature requires some degree of distance.[10]

- In an absence of a single authoritative FBI list of designated terrorist incidents post-2005, meeting this requirement necessitated searching through public statements and speeches by political leadership, review articles, newspaper interviews, Federal indictments, and other sources to effect a positive determination for each incident that the U.S. Government (in all cases, the FBI) considered a terrorist assault as opposed to a hate crime, active shooter, or some other violent act.

This determination is not often clear or fixed in the immediate aftermath of an attack. For example, the March 2013 Boston Marathon bombing was deliberately not classified as a terrorist attack by the U.S. Treasury for insurance purposes.[11] The U.S. Government designation as terrorist or non-terrorist of the November 2013 assault on a Transportation Safety Administration checkpoint, which killed one of the Department's own, also remains ambiguous at the time of writing.[12]

Frequency

Incidents between 1980–2005 causing fatalities or injuries were those identified by the last FBI statistical review of terrorism in the U.S.[13] Incidents occurring from 2006–2012 were those specifically identified as terrorist acts in subsequent FBI reviews and official statements.

[7] START GTD (2013).
[8] Including territories and possessions identified in the Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended.
[9] FBI (2006).
[10] FBI (2006) 32 (2002 LAX shooter discussion).
[11] Insurance Journal (2014, September 19), (2013, November 27).
[12] February 2015.
[13] FBI (2006).

Incidents that targeted and resulted in harm to specific individuals were classified as assassinations outside the scope of the other events.[14] Literature sources, in particular but not limited to the other FBI statistical annual reports[15] (1981–2005) and the START Global Terrorism Database,[16] were consulted to determine the discriminate or indiscriminate nature of the attack. Incidents involving the use of explosives as the primary instrument of violence,[17] aircraft as a weapon, or unconventional (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)) materials were excluded from the scope of the Armed Assault event. One incident involved an attack with a vehicle, driven into a crowd as opposed to a vehicle bomb;[18] the remainder involved firearms.

To identify the national risk baseline for this kind of attack, the resulting list of 16 incidents were analyzed as a recurring historical event similar to the SNRA's analysis of natural and technological hazards.

- In part, this reflects agnosticism in the absence of other public information of predictive value. Terrorism is driven by multiple deterministic drivers, as well as stochastic (chance) factors. However, without knowledge of those factors that would both remain valid and have predictive value for each successful attack in the U.S. for the next 3–5 years (the time frame of the 2015 SNRA), representation as a random event without additional qualifications accurately represents our actual state of knowledge.[19]
- Additionally, given current disagreements about the nature and future path of terrorism, this choice is also motivated by the utility of a description of the historical baseline which can be objectively agreed upon, by decision makers with differing beliefs about the future threat environment, as a common point of departure.
- However, it is also chosen for consistence with the findings of past U.S. Government reviews that periods of political violence of even greater intensity—and public awareness of that intensity—than that of today are in fact the historical norm for our country, rather than the exception.[20]

The average frequency of attacks in the 33-year observation period was used as the basis of the best estimate. Similar to natural hazards, the low estimate of frequency is the inverse of the longest time gap between events (the longest inter-arrival time), and the high estimate the largest number of events in one year.

Health and Safety

Perpetrator fatalities and injuries were not counted. For events occurring 1980–2005, the numbers given by the FBI were used. For events occurring 2006–2012, the numbers given by the

[14] Assassinations are not currently considered in the SNRA, but are part of one of the Department's highest profile missions (protection of dignitaries).
[15] FBI (1992), FBI (1993), FBI (1994), FBI (1995), FBI (1996), FBI (1997), FBI (1998), FBI (1999), FBI (2000), FBI (2001), FBI (2006).
[16] START GTD (2013).
[17] This division is intended to clarify the scope of the SNRA 2015 explosives and armed assault events. Although SNRA 2011 national-level events were intended to be mutually exclusive in scope, the focus of the Armed Assault attack on coordinated team attacks using hand -carried explosives resulted in a substantial overlap of the historical data sets used for the primary impact estimates of each event. While this is not a methodological issue when the data are intentionally used as proxy estimates for future attacks in the U.S. as they were in the 2011 SNRA (both events used worldwide 1970–2010 incident data from the START GTD), it becomes a prohibitive issue when the same historical data are used as the basis for each event's frequency estimates, as they are in SNRA 2015.
[18] The 3/3/2006 Chapel Hill assault (Table 1).
[19] Mohtadi et al (2005, 2009a).
[20] Staff and Commission reports and data set produced for/by the 1968–69 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Graham et al (1969), Kirkham et al (1969), Levy (1969a, b, c), National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969)). See also [non-USG] Gage (2004), Gage (2011), START GTD (2013), Turchin et al (2014).

primary FBI sources were supplemented with data from the GTD and other sources. The average number of fatalities and injuries were taken as the best estimates.

- The low estimate for both fatalities and injuries is zero, since events with one fatality and zero injuries (and the converse) define the lower threshold of the set.
- Rather than the highest of this set, the high estimates for fatalities and injuries are taken from the September 2004 school siege and massacre in the Russian town of Beslan to represent the range of catastrophic human consequences evidenced by history to be possible outcomes of terrorist armed assault attacks.[21]

Direct Economic Loss

The SNRA direct economic metric includes

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction (DDP):** The value or replacement cost of physical buildings, infrastructure, building contents, vehicles, and other physical property directly destroyed by the attack. This includes decontamination, if any, and debris removal costs.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption costs caused directly by the incident or the immediate investigation, as opposed to shock, substitution, or second-order effects on the economy.
- **Medical Costs:** Cost of medical care to injured, including those who become fatalities.
- **Lost Demand from Fatalities:** No economic value was assigned to a human life (or injury) in itself as a Value of Statistical Life, because this is a value judgment which differs from person to person, and because it would represent double counting with these impacts counted separately. The lost contribution to the national economy as spending was captured, but capped at one year for consistency with benchmark risk assessments. This value was taken at $42,500, the midpoint of the median $35,000–$50,000 household earning value used as the average one year spending per person by past assessments.

Direct economic costs were calculated by the SNRA project team using the following assumptions:

- **DDP Costs:** The SNRA project team made the assumption that the property damage costs were dominated by the other costs counted under the direct economic damage metric, and could be neglected in comparison for the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA.[22] Except for the most complex armed assault events such as Beslan or the 2008 Mumbai attacks—conducted by coordinated assault teams using hand-carried explosives or incendiaries in addition to guns—the direct property damages of active-shooter attacks (terrorist or otherwise) are much smaller than for explosives or other terrorist attack types.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption costs were estimated from the $10 million lost business costs to the approximately 500 businesses in the 12-block immediate impact area of

[21] Official figures, Russian Government. 334 fatalities and 810 non-fatal injuries include victims and response personnel (civil and military), but does not include the hostage-takers. RT (2014).

[22] The scope of the Armed Assault event contains spectacular exceptions, some of which—such as the 2008 coordinated team attacks in Mumbai, India—comprise the original exemplar of the Armed Assault event in the 2011 SNRA. However, the SNRA 2011 data which define the scope of the event in fact are dominated by small-scale shooting incidents which would be categorized as active shooter or spree killer incidents were they not politically motivated.

the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing that was restricted for approximately one week of investigation.[23]

  - The size and duration of the restricted immediate impact area was considered to be a reasonable estimate for the post-attack investigation of any terrorist attack of comparable magnitude in this country.
  - For the purposes of estimating business interruption costs for armed assault attacks, the resulting proportional multiplier of $37,000 per casualty (fatality + injury) of the Boston bombings was used to estimate business interruption costs for the historical armed assault attacks in this data set.[24]

- **Medical Costs:** An average medical cost of $5,200 per fatality and $24,000 per non-lethal injury[25] was applied. These estimates, based upon the average medical costs for gunshot injuries due to deliberate assault or homicide in the U.S., were judged to be most representative of injuries due to other extreme violence and were used for each of the conventional terrorism events of the 2015 SNRA.
- **Lost Demand from Fatalities:** To estimate the costs of lost demand from deaths, the SNRA project team multiplied the number of deaths listed in Table 1 by $42,500, the same figure used across the SNRA 2011 events.[26,27]

As with the fatality and injury numbers, the lowest and average estimates of the historical data set were used as the low and best estimates of direct economic loss. The high estimate is that of the representative worst case scenario based on the Beslan attack, with the same multipliers applied to fatalities and injuries to estimate the direct economic costs of a similar scale scenario in this country.

Indirect, induced, or total economic loss estimates were not calculated for the 2015 revision of the SNRA.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

[23] Exclusion zone 12 blocks, with 500 businesses, Luna (2013); cost to businesses in exclusion zone for one week restrictions $10 million, Dedman et al (2013). Costs of the citywide lockdown and law enforcement deployment were excluded from the estimate here, because they are not characteristic of the aftermath of most terrorist attacks in this country. Direct property damage costs were also excluded, since these were specific to the bomb attack. Note that estimates of $250–$300 million often reported (Green et al (2013), Dedman et al (2013), Luna (2013)) in the media refer to costs of the lockdown. They are a reasonable estimate of this (being calculated as a 1/2-1/3 of one day's economic activity of Boston), but such broad lockdowns accompany few, if any, of the other bombing and shooting attacks included here. Most conventional-weapon terrorist attacks (bombs, flame, guns) are very localized in their direct effects to property and business interruption.

[24] This counts interruptions to public sector activity, such as the Fort Hood or Little Rock shootings at U.S. Government facilities, on the same basis as private sector economic activity. This equivalence is applied only in this estimator (e.g., lost taxes or parking fines and public sector response costs not counted in the medical costs are not included in the total direct economic loss estimates).

[25] Medical cost per fatal and non-fatal injury for gunshot injuries in the United States from Corso et al (2007), adjusted from 2000 to 2011 dollars using the general CPI-U inflator (1.306). Estimated costs from lost labor productivity are not included.

[26] This number originates from the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA 2008) (the BTRA as a whole is classified Secret, but its economic methodology appendix is U//FOUO), and represents the midpoint (the expected value of a linear uniform distribution over the interval) of the $35,000–$50,000 median household income band in 2011. DHS (2008) pp. E2.7-34. (Appendix reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

[27] Some calculations in prior estimates subtract, from the base $42,500 per fatality, $6,000 for increased economic activity from funerary expenses. As this difference was inconsistently applied in the 2011 SNRA and was considered insignificant within the targeted order of magnitude precision of the SNRA, this adjustment was discontinued for new estimates generated for the 2015 revision.

Since attacks targeted at specific persons were excluded from the scope of the armed assault event, all attacks in this set occurred in public places rather than private homes or residential neighborhoods. For this reason, the project team assumed that the number of persons displaced from their homes would be zero for all three of the low, best, and high estimates.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.[28] The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited (in 2011) from subject matter experts for weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

- The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5\ Fat + Inj + \frac{1}{2}\ D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, *Fat* is the number of fatalities, *Inj* is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and *D* is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).
- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.
- The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by the experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Armed Assault was given a C_{EF} of 1.1.
- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).

[28] See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)[29] as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as "*de minimus*." Environmental impacts would be minimal.

Trend Adjustment (Optional)

Although it is not applied in this summary sheet, an alternative analysis could incorporate trend information from allied nations with similar security conditions (Western Europe and Canada) by multiplying the best and high estimate frequencies by a factor proportional to the frequency of current attacks relative to 4–5 years ago. This adjustment should be considered only if the trend is unambiguous.

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[29] The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as 'consequences' because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, 'impact' is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word 'consequence' within FEMA.

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Additional Relevant Information

Table 1: U.S. Historical Incidents 1980–2012

Date	City	State	Fatal	Injured	Displ.[1]	DE (2011)[2,3]	Perpetrator	Target	Source[4]
4/19/80	Chattanooga	TN	0	4	0*	$240,000	Ku Klux Klan	Crowd	FBI[5]
11/27/81	Fort Buchanan	PR	0	1	0*	$61,000	PR nationalists	Military base	FBI[6]
5/16/82	San Juan	PR	1	3	0*	$270,000	PR nationalists	U.S. Navy sailors	FBI[7]
5/19/82	Villa Sin Miedo	PR	1	12	0*	$820,000	PR nationalists	Police	FBI[8]
2/13/83	Medina	ND	2	4	0*	$410,000	Sheriff's Posse Comitatus	Police, U.S. Marshals	FBI[9]
11/06/85	Bayamon	PR	0	1	0*	$61,000	PR nationalists	U.S. Army soldier	FBI[10]
3/1/94	New York	NY	1	3	0*	$270,000	Individual	Jewish students in van	GTD, FBI[11]
7/02-04/99	Multiple[12]	IL, IN	2	8	0*	$660,000	Individual	Multiple minorities	GTD, FBI[13]
8/10/99	Granada Hills	CA	1	5	0*	$390,000	Individual	Jews, Asians	FBI[14]
7/4/02	Los Angeles	CA	2	4	0*	$410,000	Individual	El Al terminal LAX	GTD, FBI[15]
3/3/06	Chapel Hill	NC	0	9[16]	0*	$550,000	Individual	Car driven into crowd	GTD, FBI[17]
6/1/09	Little Rock	AR	1	1	0*	$150,000	Individual	Recruiting center	GTD, FBI[18]
6/10/09	Washington	DC	1	0	0*	$85,000	Individual	U.S. Holocaust Museum	FBI, P[19]
11/5/09	Fort Hood	TX	13	32	0*	$3,000,000	Individual	Fellow soldiers	GTD, FBI, P[20]
8/05/12	Oak Creek	WI	6	4	0*	$750,000	Individual	Sikh worshippers	GTD, FBI, P[21]
8/15/12	Washington	DC	0	1	0*	$61,000	Individual	Family Research Council	GTD, FBI[22]

[Supplemental] Table 2: Terrorist Armed Assault Incidents 1980-2005 Without Injuries/Fatalities[23]

Date	City	State	Fatal	Injured	Displ.	DE (2011)	Perpetrator	Target	Source
4/29/82	San Juan	PR	0	0	0*	$230,000	PR nationalists	PR government building	FBI[24]

[1] Persons displaced from home for 2 or more days assumed to be zero for all events except where indicated otherwise by the source(s). Assumed zeroes are marked with an asterix; other zeroes from sources.
[2] DE = Direct economic loss, 2011 dollars. All numbers are estimates based upon extrapolations from a subset of incidents. For the definition of direct economic loss used in the SNRA see the text of this risk summary sheet above.
[3] For the armed assault events, decontamination/disposal/physical destruction (DDP) was assumed to be zero (insignificant in proportion to other components); business interruption, $37,000 per fatality and injury as multiplier based upon the $10 million direct lost income (Dedman et al (2013)) of the 500 businesses in the 12-block restriction zone during the one week of investigation following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, Luna (2013); medical costs, $5,200 per fatality and $24,000 per non-fatal injury, average medical costs for gunshot injuries in the U.S. from Corso et al (2007) excluding costs from lost labor productivity; and $42,500 one year lost spending per fatality. All costs adjusted to 2011 dollars.
[4] Where FBI and other sources differ on details (date, location, fatalities, injuries), the FBI figures are given.
[5] FBI (2006).
[6] FBI (1982, 2006).
[7] FBI (1983, 2006).
[8] FBI (1983, 2006).
[9] FBI (1984, 2006).
[10] FBI (1986, 2006).
[11] GTD 199403010007, FBI (2006).
[12] Chicago, Skokie, and Northbrook IL, and Bloomington IN.
[13] FBI (2000) pp 4-5 and FBI (2006), list. GTD 199907020004, 199907020005, 199907020006, 199907030007, 199907030008, 199907040005, but coded as doubtful for terrorism (doubtterr=1).
[14] FBI (2000) p 5 and FBI (2006), list. Also GTD 199908100001, but coded as doubtful for terrorism (doubtterr=1).
[15] GTD 200202040010, FBI (2006).
[16] While all injuries were comparatively minor, they included several broken bones; six people assaulted were taken to hospital, treated, and released. Braun et al (2014).
[17] GTD 200603030013, FBI (2011).
[18] FBI (2011). GTD event 200906010028, but not coded as meeting terrorism criterion 3. For detail see Coleman et al (2011).
[19] FBI (2011), Obama (2013). Also GTD 200906100003, but not coded as meeting terrorism criterion 2.
[20] GTD 200911060002, FBI (2011), Obama (2013). GTD lists date as 11/06/2009 and 31 injuries; FBI lists 32 injuries. NCTC 2014 Counterterrorism Calendar (not cited) lists 29 wounded.
[21] GTD 201208050006, FBI (2011), Obama (2013).
[22] GTD 201208150059. FBI: FBI statement in U.S. Attorney DC (2013, September 19); also confession and conviction to terrorism charge (District of Columbia Code).
[23] FBI (1983, 2006). Not used to calculate frequency or impact estimates in May 2015 SNRA because outside event threshold. Added to this documentation subsequent to SNRA 2015 project (June 2015) to permit calculation using alternative threshold ([FBI designated] terrorist attack regardless of impact, same as Explosives Terrorism Attack and CBRN events: Appendix K table K.4). Note that incident point frequency will differ from Table 1 events due to differing observation periods (1/33 years, Table 1, 1/26 years, Table 2). As with Table 1, assassination attempts (targeted as opposed to indiscriminate) are excluded; also excluded are two unarmed assaults intended as protests or harassment ("burning ribbon" thrown at speaker, 2/9/1981; unarmed menacing of diplomats by protest group, 9/9/1981) not resulting in injury.
[24] FBI (1983). Shooting assault on Puerto Rico Justice Building, guard escaped injury: $100,000 (1982) property damage.